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Abstract
This article introduces the Rising Powers Diplomatic Network (RPDN) dataset, 
which monitors the distribution of the diplomatic apparatus of emerging powers 
across the globe. RPDN’s release version contains data on two countries, Brazil and 
Turkey, covering mainly the 1995-2015 timespan, thus providing a comprehen-
sive portrait of the evolution of their diplomatic capacity and patterns of interstate 
interactions. Specifically, RPDN contains information on two items: presidential 
diplomacy (i.e.: number of official visits) and diplomatic presence (number and 
size of diplomatic representations abroad). Data for Turkey also list visits by the 
prime minister in addition to the president’s. Data for Brazil also report: size of 
staff at each diplomatic post, post ranking/grade and number of military attachés 
abroad. The article concludes demonstrating RPDN’s applicability, by addressing 
a central question in the regional powers literature: do regional powers emphasize 
their regions in their diplomacy in comparison to other destinations? It is expected 
that this dataset makes a contribution to quantitative research on rising powers and 
their diplomacy.
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Introduction
This article introduces the dataset “Rising Powers Diplomatic Network” (RPDN, 
available at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/5FISNQ) and displays its main fea-
tures. RPDN contains data on the distribution of the diplomatic assets of emerg-
ing powers over time. Specifically, the release version brings data on Brazilian 
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and Turkish presidential diplomacy (i.e.: official visits by the head of state or 
government) and diplomatic presence (scope and size of diplomatic representa-
tions abroad), covering mainly the 1995-2015 time period. 
The overarching goal behind RPDN is to allow for better empirical analyses of 
emerging countries’ international behavior. As with other policy domains, diplo-
macy is one of the fields for which data are abundant for developed nations, but 
scarce elsewhere. Consequently, scholarship has been constrained on the variety 
of research it is able to conduct regarding emerging powers, as well as on the 
generality of its findings. Even research agendas that have developed around and 
focused intensively on such countries have suffered from this underprovision. The 
regional powers research agenda, for instance, has produced significant insight on 
features of regional powers as analytical concepts and a wealth of in-depth analy-
ses, but has struggled to cumulate its findings and test its theoretical predicates 
beyond the confines of single case studies.
RPDN is an initial attempt to bridge that gap, since it provides original quanti-
tative data on two countries that have captured much academic attention in the 
past two decades. We hope that this dataset can make a valuable contribution 
to scholarship focused on the empirical analysis of emerging powers’ diplomacy.
The purpose of the current article is threefold. Firstly, to expound the motiva-
tion underpinning the creation of RPDN and its expected scholarly contribution. 
Secondly, to present RPDN, its variables, scope, main features, and to describe 
the data-gathering procedures adopted. Lastly, the article exemplifies RPDN in 
usage, showing how its data can be valuable for a solid, empirically grounded 
understanding of the international behavior of emerging powers. In particular, we 
will address one of the lingering questions in the literature on regional powers, 
namely, whether or not regional powers emphasize their regions in their diplo-
macy in comparison to other destinations. These three points are also the struc-
ture of this article.
Motivation and Expected Contribution to Scholarship
The main motivation behind RPDN is to allow for thorough quantitative study of 
emerging powers in International Relations (IR). In particular, it seeks to advance 
available knowledge on the matter of diplomacy.
Diplomatic activity is one of the enduring fields of interest in IR and it has been 
approached from varied angles. Traditional diplomacy and its more recent presi-
dential variant have been analyzed as both dependent and independent variables. 
The former type of research design focuses on uncovering the determinants of 
state visits (Lebovic & Saunders 2016), while the latter attempts to gauge the 
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independent effect of high-level trips on matters such as trade (Nitsch 2007) and 
public opinion (Goldsmith & Horiuchi 2009).
In general, the literature accepts that state visits are a manifestation of a coun-
try’s preferences and interests in the global arena. Most of the aforementioned 
research, however, shares a shortcoming: it is restricted to the US and Europe. 
Investigations of this nature on less developed states have been hitherto scant due 
to a number of factors, most notably the difficulty in finding reliable longitudinal 
data.
Diplomatic networks, in turn, are also an established object of research. Since 
Singer and Small’s (1966) seminal work, the type and ranking of diplomatic rep-
resentation established between dyads of countries have been utilized as indica-
tors of varied concepts.1 Scholarship on international status has regarded rep-
resentation as a proxy for a country’s standing in the international community 
(Neumayer 2008; Kinne 2014), while research on international political economy 
models the number of embassies and consulates as a trade-promoting factor 
(Moons & van Bergeijk 2017). These studies tend to be more global in scope, 
as typical panels will have data on all sovereign states for a given year. Though 
this allows for comparison across a greater number of units, including emerging 
countries, longitudinal data remain rare, thus restricting comparisons over time.
In light of the aforementioned, it is visible that there is an information gap when 
it comes to developing nations. Academia and other observers have repeatedly 
stressed the growing relevance of emerging countries and regional powers2 in our 
increasingly multipolar reality, and yet efforts on gathering systematic informa-
tion for such states still lag behind considerably. Lall (2016, p.415) argues that 
the abundance of data on developed states, in contrast to the scarcity for the rest 
of the world, leads many studies in IR and comparative political science to suffer 
from an “advanced democracy bias”, i.e.: the majority of cases tested comes from 
the Western world, thus compromising the potential for generalization of such 
research. This skewness is not purely on the demand side, that is, solely to blame 
on any particular type of academic neglect; rather, it is often a supply issue. Less 
developed countries also tend to lack the administrative and budgetary capacity to 
systematically harness information ( Jerven 2016, pp.345–346). Not to mention, 
they might also be prone to have less transparent governments, as gathering and 
1 Noteworthy efforts to update and expand Singer and Small’s approach include the works of Bayer 
(2006) and the Lowy Institute (‘Global Diplomacy Index’ 2017).
2 The conceptual distinction between middle powers, regional powers, rising or emerging powers is not 
the central concern of this article, so that it will not be explored in detail. For the sake of expedience, 
a useful heuristic to distinguish between concepts can be found in the G20 and the BRICS. While the 
G20 can be considered a grouping of the foremost rising or emerging powers (excluding the G8 mem-
bers also present), the BRICS bloc is normally considered to be a sample of typical regional powers. For 
more on the difference between concepts, see Paes et al. (2017).
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publicizing data can have political – besides economic – costs. Thus, the avail-
ability and consistency of data for developing states has been an enduring issue, 
imposing limitations on the type of research that it is possible to conduct on such 
locations. Foreign policy is one of such areas for which information abounds for 
advanced democracies, but becomes rarer as we move away from the core Western 
states.
RPDN monitors Brazilian and Turkish diplomacy over an extended timespan. 
This is relevant in that it will provide a full picture of the evolutionary dynamics of 
their external affairs, as well as point out where these countries have been invest-
ing their diplomatic assets. For some of the metrics concerned, RPDN is the first 
resource to present longitudinal primary data. Thus, it fills an important gap, as 
it monitors the diplomatic activity of emerging countries for approximately two 
decades. Greater attention to the behavior of actors from the Global South has 
been long due, and an inquiry into which partners concentrate more diplomatic 
effort on the part of Brazil and Turkey can produce unprecedented evidence on 
the shifting landscape of international polarity.
A second matter which underscores the academic importance of RPDN relates to 
the trajectory of emerging and regional powers as a field of study. For more than a 
decade, the topic has received intense scholarly and policy attention. Based on the 
literature trends, it can be argued that this domain has advanced from an initial 
moment more oriented towards interpretation to another stage, where tests and 
validation become more relevant. The early articles on the theme started off from 
the limitations of established theories (especially middle-powermanship and re-
gionalism) in explaining the behavior of emerging countries and attempted to 
propose new categories (Hurrell 2006; Jordaan 2003; Schoeman 2000; Soares De 
Lima & Hirst 2006). In the following years, there was effort towards theoretical 
consolidation, focused on crafting generalizable typologies (Destradi 2010; Nolte 
2010; Prys 2010). Recently, applications of these typologies and their theoreti-
cal corollaries to different cases have proliferated, as researchers try to confirm 
or adjust the theoretical predicates. In particular, there has been an interest in 
broadening the conceptual space, through studies of countries that have tradition-
ally not been considered as emerging or regional powers (Alden & Le Pere 2009; 
Burges 2015; Dal 2016; Flemes 2010; Godehardt & Nabers 2011; Malamud & 
Rodriguez 2013).
Throughout this trajectory, qualitative analyses, particularly single case studies or 
few-cases comparison, have been the preferred templates. The prevalence of small 
N studies yields an important consequence with regards to the development of 
the field. Many of the hypotheses and theoretical arguments produced to date 
have limited inferential scope, as they have only been elaborated and tested to a 
small number of cases and have not yet been verified across a larger number of 
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observations (Flemes & Nolte 2010). 
Also due to this qualitative predominance, the diplomacy of rising powers has 
often been scrutinized by emphasizing some noteworthy episodes in the realm 
of high politics, such as mediation efforts, crisis management, or vicinal tensions, 
which creates problems of representativeness and rarity. A large N dataset such 
as RPDN is a significant contribution to the field, as it offers the possibility of 
testing various theoretical arguments developed so far against a vast population of 
cases, not depending exclusively on dramatic episodes of regional policy.
Having explained the main motivation of RPDN, as well as the contribution we 
expect this dataset brings to the field, we shall now unveil the actual data.
Description of RPDN
For each country included in the RPDN, two specific domains of diplomatic 
activity are recorded: (1) presidential diplomacy and (2) diplomatic presence. The 
former is presented in a single dataset, while the latter is broken down into two 
datasets, one per level of aggregation. As the release version of RPDN covers Bra-
zil and Turkey, it has a total of six individual datasets. Below, we explain each set.
Presidential Diplomacy Data
The concentration of diplomatic activity in the hands of the country’s leader is a 
typical trait of modern interstate interactions. It has been increasingly common 
that heads of state and/or government, instead of professional diplomats alone, 
take up the role of foremost representatives of their countries abroad (Cason & 
Power 2009; Rojas & Milet 1999). Emerging powers have also relied on this 
practice in their attempts to project influence. Some authors attribute part of 
those countries relative success in punching above their weight internationally 
to the direct engagement of their leaders in international affairs (Özcan, Köse 
& Karakoç 2015; Rouquié 2006), while others emphasize how the presidents’ 
institutional powers are key in maintaining certain interstate arrangements op-
erational (Malamud 2005; Mace et al. 2016).
Presidential diplomacy is normally measured via direct gestures from the head of 
state/government in interstate relations. From the range of possible actions, the 
state visit has become the privileged indicator for gauging how active a president 
is internationally, and which partners and venues it values the most (Goldstein 
2008).
 With that in mind, the measuring of Brazilian presidential diplomacy is straight-
forward: as the country has a presidential regime (i.e.: the president is both head 
of state and government), we only need to track the displacements of a single in-
dividual. Additionally, Brazilian presidents take office right on January 1st of the 
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year following their election. It is thus simple to classify Brazil’s foreign policy in 
different moments, according to the president and his/her term, and aggregating 
the results yearly. Presidencies covered by the RPDN include those of Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso (1st term: 1995-1998, 2nd: 1999-2002), Luis Inácio Lula da 
Silva (2003-2006, 2007-2010) and Dilma Rousseff (2011-2014, 2015).
The same does not apply to the Turkish case, which, for the period considered, 
had both a prime-minister (henceforth “PM”) and a president. Between 2000 and 
2015 (which is the data range for Turkey, as it will be explained in the next topic), 
Ankara had three presidents and four PMs, as summarized in Table 1 below:
Table 1: Timeline of Turkish presidents and PMs (2000-2015)
Year President Time Period PM Time Period
2000
Ahmet Necdet Sezer 
(independent)
From 16/05/2000 to 
28/08/2007
Bülent Ecevit (DSP, coali-
tion with MHP-ANAP) From 11/01/1999 to 18/11/20022001
2002
2003 Abdullah Gül (AKP) From 18/11/2002 to 14/03/2003
2004
Recep Tayyip Erdogan 
(AKP) From 14/03/2003 to 28/08/2014
2005
2006
2007
2008
Abdullah Gül (AKP) From 28/08/2007 to 28/08/2014
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015 Recep Tayyip Erdogan (AKP) From 28/08/2014 Ahmet Davutoğlu (AKP) From 28/08/2014 to 24/05/2016
Source: Elaborated by the author.
In fact, the terms held by the president and the PM are not synchronic and have 
at times been occupied by different parties, which complicates periodization. For 
this article, the successive PM cabinets were adopted as the standard time refer-
ences, as it is usually done in the empiricist literature (cf. Çakır & Akdağ 2017). 
During the analyzed period, there were three general elections: November 2002, 
July 2007 and June 2011.3 In such occasions, a new cabinet was formed, led by 
3 In 2015 there were two elections to compose a new parliament. The first one took place in June and, 
as it led to a hung parliament, another one was held in November. The results of the November 2015 
election are not taken into consideration for our periodization since they are considered only to take 
effect in 2016 (according to the categorization rule adopted for RPDN) and thus escape the period 
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the PM. Thus, the interval between 2000 and 2015 can be divided into four dis-
tinct governments: one cabinet under the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition (2000-
2002), and three others under the AKP (2003-2007, 2008-2011 and 2012-2015). 
It should be noted that, by adopting this periodization, there will be terms when 
either the president (Gül - Erdogan in 2015) or the PM (Gül - Erdogan in 2003, 
Erdogan - Davutoğlu in 2015) were replaced during the same administration.
Another difference with regards to Brazil is that the onset of new governments 
in Turkey is not synchronic with calendar years, as new cabinets might take of-
fice in the middle of a given year. As this article uses years as the base interval of 
analysis, it is necessary to devise a solution to allocate governmental changes that 
occur during a regular calendar year. For ease of periodization, changes in Turkish 
government taking place in the second semester of a given year are coded as tak-
ing effect in the following year. This procedure is necessary due to our interest in 
yearly data. Researchers working on a different unit scale might feel no need for 
such adjustments and preserve the precise dates of cabinet changes.
Table 2 presents the main variables of substantive interest in the presidential di-
plomacy datasets for Brazil and Turkey.4
Table 2: Main variables of substantive interest in the RPDN Presidential 
Diplomacy datasets
Variable Name Description Type Brazil Value Range Turkey Value Range
dest_type Destination type. Five possible values Categorical
“STATE”: Destination is a State;
“IO”: Destination is an Interna-
tional Organization;
“RO”: Destination is a Regional 
Organization;
“RRO”: Destination is a Region-
Region Organization;
“RSO”: Destination is a Region-
State Organization
“STATE”; “IO”; 
“RO”; “RRO”; “RSO”
dest_name Name of destination Categorical 127 unique countries and organi-zations recorded
146 unique countries 
and organizations 
recorded
n_days
Length of visit in 
number of days (when 
reported). Counting 
of days starts at 1 (if 
return on the same 
day), so that count = 
2 if return is the on 
the following day, 
and so forth. Variable 
applicable only to 
dest_type = STATE 
(NA if other)
Discrete NA; 1 – 8 NA; 1 – 10
of interest.
4 Identification variables, such as ISO codes, were omitted from the table; refer to codebook for full 
list of variables.
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Variable Name Description Type Brazil Value Range Turkey Value Range
multi
Dummy variable for 
multilateral events. 
Equals 0 when pur-
pose of travel to for-
eign state is bilateral 
visit and 1 when it is 
a multilateral event. 
Variable applicable 
only to dest_type = 
STATE (NA if other)
Categorical NA; 0; 1 NA; 0; 1
TOTAL NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 626 687
Source: Elaborated by the author.
Data-gathering process
Brazil
RPDN counts official visits abroad by Brazilian presidents from 1995 to 2015. 
The data were collected from the lists made available by the Library of the Presi-
dency of the Republic of Brazil.5 Additional information was gathered from me-
dia reports and from the webpage of one of the former president’s personal foun-
dation.6 To assemble the base, all official visits to foreign countries were counted, 
including those to attend summits and multilateral events. Neither receptions of 
foreign representatives in Brazil, nor international events based in the country 
were computed, since the records of such events were not kept consistently over 
the years for all the lists consulted.
Turkey
The original ambition with RPDN was to collect information from the 1990s 
to the 2010s for both Brazil and Turkey. Empirical difficulties, however, made 
it necessary to moderate this aim, reducing both the temporal extension and the 
number of observed indicators for Turkish diplomacy.
As mentioned, Ankara differs from Brasilia in its form of government. For the pe-
riod studied, the Turkish system was parliamentary. Thus, the country presented 
both a president (head of state) and a PM (head of government). This institution-
al configuration was only amended by the constitutional referendum of April 16, 
2017, which abolished the post of PM and established a fully presidential regime. 
As the studied interval ends in 2015, this change is not taken into account, so that 
Turkey has, during the period considered, both a president and a PM.
5 Available at: <http://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/presidencia/ex-presidentes>. Accessed on 
08-07-2018
6 Instituto FHC. List of travels by former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso available at: <http://
acervo.ifhc.org.br/ModuloPesquisador/jsp/doctosApoio/8/viagens_1995_2002_alfa.pdf>. Accessed on 
05-01-2019
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It is a matter of debate in the literature whether it is the president or the PM who 
exerts more influence in foreign policy (Robins 2003; Gumuscu 2016). Indeed, 
the relationship between the two seems to be variable and contingent. For the 
period under review, both figures can be seen performing similar duties: repre-
senting Turkey in summits and multilateral events, hosting visiting heads of state 
and leading mediation initiatives. It is, therefore, difficult to discern whether each 
actor has its own jurisdiction in the international arena, or if both act concurrently 
and in equal capacity. This apparent equivalence implies that focusing on only one 
of the two representatives may be misleading, since it would omit the gestures of 
another equally important agent.
Therefore, in order to avoid a partial depiction of Turkish diplomacy, RPDN pres-
ents the metrics of presidential diplomacy for both the president and the PM. The 
term employed remains “presidential diplomacy”, though no longer restricted to 
the head of state alone. Official travel data were collected from various sources: 
the official websites of the Presidency7 and of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA)8, the personal webpage of one of the former presidents9, several news sites, 
official government press10, and other miscellaneous sources.
Limits were set by data availability. It was possible to collect data with sufficient 
reliability from the year 2000 to 2015. Errors and omissions are nonetheless still 
possible, particular for the early years, since information on displacements is not 
systematized in a single standardized source throughout the period.
Diplomatic Presence Data
RPDN monitors the geographic distribution of diplomatic capacities of the Bra-
zilian and Turkish foreign relations ministries. We term this allocation “diplomat-
ic presence”, as it represents a way to gauge where do emerging power choose to 
be more present. Such diplomatic investment can be weighted and compared in 
different forms. In RPDN, we understand that it relates to the size or complexity 
of the diplomatic mission in each country. That is, it can be assumed that a larger 
mission in a given host country (i.e.: more stations and posts, as well as personnel) 
means greater presence, and this in turn is a token of how highly this country is 
regarded in the foreign relations of the emerging power. 11
7 Website of the Presidency of the Turkish Republic: www.tccb.gov.tr. Accessed on 22-07-2018
8 Turkish MFA website: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/. Accessed on 22-07-2018. Note that, though the 
Ministry’s official name in Turkish is “Dışişleri Bakanlığı”, it regularly uses the English translation 
“Ministry of Foreign Affairs” in its international publications, so that the acronym “MFA” is utilized 
in this article as well.
9 Personal website of former president Abdullah Gül: www.abdullahgul.gen.tr. Accessed on 22-07-
2018
10 The Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey (“T. C. Remis Gazete”) reports absences from the 
head of state due to official visits abroad. Available at www.resmigazete.gov.tr. Accessed on 22-07-2018
11 For an overview of the theoretical arguments linking the choice of where to open diplomatic rep-
16
Rafael Mesquita
The assessment of Brazilian and Turkish diplomatic presence abroad relies on 
official data on consular activity published by each country’s ministry. As this in-
formation is not uniformly registered and publicized by each country, the amount 
of indicators we are able to utilize in RPDN varies from case to case.
For Brazil, we were able to collect data from 1995 to 2015. A total of four vari-
ables were monitored: the number and type of official representations abroad, 
the number of employees in these posts, hierarchical ranking of each post, and 
the number of military attachés abroad. For Turkey, in turn, fewer empirical in-
dicators were available. We could only compute the number and type of official 
representations abroad, albeit for a longer time period (1995 to 2017).
Diplomatic presence data are available on two levels of aggregation: city and 
country. The first dataset presents diplomatic posts and related variables per city, 
while the latter aggregates the city data into national level. For Brazil, some vari-
ables are exclusive to the level of aggregation: post raking is only available on city 
level (as this cannot be aggregated nationally), and number of military attachés 
only on country level (as it cannot be disaggregated into cities).
Tables 3 and 4 present the substantive variables of the diplomatic presence data-
sets on the city and country levels of aggregation, respectively. As the city-level 
data records some information on different levels, a column for “level of observa-
tion” is added to Table 3 so as to distinguish between values pertaining to cities 
(level 1) and countries (level 2).
Table 3: Main variables of substantive interest in the RPDN Diplomatic Pres-
ence datasets (city level)
Variable 
name Description
Level of 
obs. Type Brazil Value Range
Turkey Value 
Range
host_city Name of the city hosting the diplomatic post 1 Categorical 209 unique names
222 unique 
names
host_type Type of host. Three possible values: 2 Categorical “STATE”; “IO”; “RO” “STATE”; “IO”
host_name
Name of country/organiza-
tion hosting the diplomatic 
post
2 Categorical 152 unique names 145 unique names
post_type Type of diplomatic post. Six possible values: 1 Categorical
“EM”: Embassy;
“CG”: Consulate General;
“C”: Consulate;
“VC”: Vice-Consulate;
“OF”: Office (commercial, 
representation, liaison)
“DE”: Delegation (for IO 
and RO only)
“EM”; “CG”; 
“DE”
resentations and a country’s strategic preferences, refer to Singer and Small (1966), Neumayer (2008) 
and Kinne (2014).
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Variable 
name Description
Level of 
obs. Type Brazil Value Range
Turkey Value 
Range
post_pers Number of personnel sta-tioned at the diplomatic post 1 Discrete 0 – 51
(Variable not 
available)
post_rank
Ranking of the diplomatic 
post. Four possible values: 
A, B, C, D. Rankings only 
appear on the consulted MRE 
lists from 1997 on. Ranking 
range was broadened from 
A-C to A-D in 2007.
1 Ordinal
A – C (until 2006);
A – D (from 2007 on) (Variable not available)
imp
Dummy variable for missing 
data imputation. Equals 0 if 
data is original, 1 if imputa-
tion was applied. Linear 
interpolation and repetition 
of preceding value were the 
adopted approaches.
1 Categorical 1; 0 (Variable not available)
TOTAL NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 4022 4263
Source: Elaborated by the author.
Table 4: Main variables of substantive interest in the RPDN Diplomatic Pres-
ence datasets (country level)
Variable 
name Description Type Brazil Value Range Turkey Value Range
host_name Name of country/organization hosting the diplomatic post Categorical 152 unique names 145 unique names
host_type Type of host. Three possible values: Categorical “STATE”; “IO”; “RO” “STATE”; “IO”
n_pers Total number of personnel stationed in host country/organization Discrete 0 – 206
(Variable not avail-
able)
n_posts
Total number of diplomatic posts in 
host country/organization, combining 
embassies and other stations
Discrete 1 – 12 1 – 14
n_mil_at
Total number of military attachés 
stationed in host country. Count adds 
military attachés, deputy officers and 
assistants
Discrete 0 – 12 (Variable not avail-able)
imp
Dummy variable for missing data 
imputation. Equals 0 if data is original, 
1 if imputation was applied. Linear in-
terpolation and repetition of preceding 
value were the adopted approaches.
Categorical 1; 0 (Variable not avail-able)
TOTAL NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 2464 2773
Source: Elaborated by the author.
Data-gathering process
Brazil
Information on Brazilian representations was obtained from the Ministry of For-
eign Relations (“Ministério das Relações Exteriores”, MRE, also known as Itama-
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raty). Specifically, from the personnel lists published semi-annually, which were 
retrieved via in situ research in August 2016 by the author in the Azeredo da 
Silveira Library in the ministry, where print copies are kept.
The lists contain information on the number and type of posts abroad, their rank-
ing, and how many employees work in each one of them. They do not report the 
vacant positions or the expected capacity of each post. Instead, they present solely 
how many employees are actually working on site.12 Records were not available for 
the whole period of interest: there was no list for the year 2005, so that imputation 
was required to complete the dataset.
The number of military attachés was not available in the lists, since the matter is 
handled by the Ministry of Defense. Thus, we analyzed a collection of presidential 
decrees (“decretos presidenciais”), issued between 1994 and 2015, determining how 
many attachés, deputy officers and auxiliaries should be allocated abroad.13 The 
quantities do not necessarily change every year. It was common to find an interval 
of two to three years between the publication of new decrees updating the count. 
It was considered that the number of attachés remains unchanged until modified 
by a subsequent decree. Also, as the decrees do not specify the city of the posting, 
this information could only be presented at the national level.
Combining information from Itamaraty and presidential decrees comes at a 
cost. While the Itamaraty lists are administrative reports and therefore inform 
how many people are actually at each post, presidential decrees are legislation, 
establishing how many attachés should be in each country, with no reference as 
to whether they are actually there. Thus, it must be borne in mind that while the 
“number of diplomatic personnel” indicator refers to the actual staff count, the 
“number of military attachés” indicator shows the existing positions, occupied or 
not. It is expected, therefore, that the count of military attachés may be slightly 
inaccurate and perhaps upwardly biased.
Turkey
Data availability was smaller for Turkey than it was for Brazil. Therefore, its mea-
surement of diplomatic presence had to be operationalized with less indicators. 
Only information on the number and type of posts abroad was gathered. The 
data were provided by the MFA itself, upon request by the author. The spread-
12 Thus, it is not possible to know, for instance, if a post listing nine employees should have precisely 
nine people or, instead, ten, but one of the positions was still not filled.
13 DECRETO Nº 1.299, DE 31 DE OUTUBRO DE 1994; DECRETO Nº 2.098, DE 18 DE 
DEZEMBRO DE 1996; DECRETO Nº 2.583, DE 12 DE MAIO DE 1998; DECRETO N° 3.397, 
DE 30 DE MARÇO DE 2000; DECRETO Nº 5.294 DE 1º DE DEZEMBRO DE 2004; DECRE-
TO Nº 6.773, DE 18 DE FEVEREIRO DE 2009; DECRETO Nº 7.848, DE 23 DE NOVEMBRO 
DE 2012; DECRETO Nº 8.125, DE 21 DE OUTUBRO DE 2013; DECRETO Nº 8.460, DE 26 DE 
MAIO DE 2015. Available at: <http://www.planalto.gov.br>. Accessed on: 29-07-2017
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sheet provided by the ministry contained the opening years for all embassies and 
consulates. By reporting only opening dates, the spreadsheet is useful to indicate 
the cumulative total of posts that each country comes to host over time. How-
ever, it does not contain information on the closure of stations or other forms of 
diplomatic retraction. For this reason, the data may have an upward bias, since 
information on reductions is suppressed.
Example of Usage: Assessing Regional Diplomatic Attention
The data in RPDN can be useful in various academic ventures. In this section, we 
try to briefly point out – by no means exhaustively – some of the information that 
can be extracted from it and types of research problems that it can answer. In par-
ticular, RPDN data will be utilized to address one of the main research questions 
which has been lingering on the regional powers literature. Namely, do regional 
powers effectively prioritize their regions in their diplomatic efforts? Or do they 
invest greater diplomatic attention elsewhere? 
One of the core assumptions of the research agenda on regional powers was that 
these actors displayed significant levels of regional influence and engagement 
(Nolte 2010; Flemes & Nolte 2010). Such prioritization, however, was largely 
assumed instead of verified consistently. In fact, regional powers might have in-
centives to remain detached from vicinal matters and pursue their aims elsewhere 
(Prys 2010; Hurrell 2010). The ambiguous readings on Brazilian and Turkish re-
gionalism testify to this indeterminacy.
Regarding Brazil, scholarship is not consensual on the region’s centrality. It is ac-
knowledged that since the 1990s Brazil has acted as a region-shaper and outlined 
South America as its preferred area of influence – as opposed to the more dif-
fuse space of “Latin America” (Mesquita 2016; Rocha, Albuquerque & Medeiros 
2018). Ambitious regional integration and cooperation initiatives, such as Merco-
sur in the 1990s and Unasur in the 2000s, were signs of Brasilia’s willingness. Yet, 
some authors emphasize that, even though Brazil mobilizes regionalist efforts, it 
considers them as means to an end. In other words, the region is a stepping stone 
for consolidating greater influence at the global stage (Lazarou & Luciano 2015; 
Burges 2015; Krapohl, Meissner & Muntschick 2014; Malamud & Rodriguez 
2013; Steiner, Medeiros & Lima 2014). Pinheiro and Gaio (2014), in contrast, 
stress that Brasilia’s South American regionalism, particularly during the Lula da 
Silva administration, did not adopt an instrumental approach towards its neigh-
bors and that the country eventually secured a role as a regional developmental 
leader.
Turkey, in turn, has been long-regarded as the archetypical “torn country” (Hun-
tington 1993) or “cusp state” (Herzog & Robins 2014), straddling between East 
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and West. Hence, the matter of regional belonging has been a persistent Anato-
lian riddle. If we restrict our focus to recent scholarship, two grand narratives are 
underscored: Westernization and Middle-Easternization. Joining the community 
of Western states has been a stable and enduring foreign policy goal in Ankara 
(Hale 2000; Yilmaz & Bilgin 2006; Robins 2003). The most recent and momen-
tous episode of this saga was the EU accession bid in the early-2000s, which 
dominated much of the country’s foreign agenda in the beginning of decade. 
However, with the rise of the Islamist AKP to power in 2003, in addition to the 
disheartening and sluggish pace of the accession negotiations, analysts detected 
a gradual diplomatic shift. Turkey began to reduce its emphasis on Brussels and 
turn towards the Arab world, which led many to diagnose a “Middle-Eastern-
ization” of foreign relations (Altunışık 2014). Early analyses of this reorientation 
tended to consider it a pragmatic adjustment and by no means a rupture with the 
West (Oğuzlu 2008), but as time went by a growing number of scholars evaluated 
that Turkey was departing from the liberal order and adopting the style of politi-
cal Islam current in its Arab neighborhood (Öniş 2013; Arda 2015). Indeed, over 
the course of the AKP governments, Ankara sought to play a greater role in the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, at first discretely, in an attempt 
to reverse the negative regional legacy previous administrations had left, and then 
more daringly, even seeking to consolidate Turkey as a role-model for a post-Arab 
Spring MENA (Oğuzlu 2016).
Hence, it can be said that the literature on both cases has struggled to address 
analogous questions. How important is South America in Brazil’s diplomatic 
activity? How robust was Turkey’s diplomatic shift away from Europe and to-
wards the MENA? Though there have been some inventive attempts to gauge 
diplomatic attention devoted to regions,14 there has been no standard approach 
to measure diplomatic activity across countries. Thus, much of the evidence on 
diplomatic preferences remains incommensurable.
RPDN allows us to address the issue in a novel way by looking into presidential 
diplomacy and diplomatic presence. Both concepts refer to enduring practices, 
which are embedded in the underlying structure of modern statehood and there-
fore have come to acquire stable meaning and significance for nearly all coun-
tries (Goldstein 2008; Kinne 2014). In other words, they are valid indicators of 
diplomatic attention across several cases. In addition, both measures combined 
provide a clearer picture of a country’s diplomacy, as the presidential component 
is expected to capture a more dynamic and volitional vector, while the diplomatic 
presence should reflect deeper structural interests.
By grouping all countries listed in RPDN according to their geographic and po-
14 See for instance Jenne et al. (2017) and Çakir and Akdağ (2017).
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litical regions and then aggregating the total amount of state visits received and 
diplomatic posts,15 we are able to see which regions received a larger share of dip-
lomatic attention. Figures 1 and 2 below show the results for Brazil and Turkey, 
respectively. To ensure visual clarity, values were aggregated per president or cabi-
net, as opposed to years, and regions which were not highlighted by the literature 
as relevant within this problématique were omitted.
Figure 1: Brazilian presidential diplomacy and diplomatic presence for selected 
regions (1995-2015)16, 17
Source: Elaborated by the author.
Figure 1 shows that South America (black solid line with triangular marker) 
has consistently attracted most of Brazil’s diplomatic activity. During the whole 
period considered, it was the first destination in terms of visits and second in 
number of diplomatic posts. Though this is evidence in favor of South America’s 
priority, it is noteworthy that the region’s centrality has actually decreased in rela-
15 We chose to restrict the concept of diplomatic presence to just one indicator (i.e.: number of posts) 
in this example since some of our complementary indicators in this dataset (e.g.: number of personnel 
and military attachés) are not available for both Brazil and Turkey.
16 Diplomatic representations on international organizations (e.g.: stations in Geneva referring to 
the UN instead of the Swiss government) were not counted. Total number of official visits is equal 
to the sum of visits to countries within a region during a president’s office. Total number of posts is 
equal to the sum, for all countries in a region, of the mean number of posts a country had during an 
office. Countries were ascribed to specific regions based on geographical classifications utilized by each 
country’s Ministry of Foreign Relations. Regional classifications are not included originally in RPDN 
as future users might have diverging views on the borders of a given region. Data for Brazil in 2005 
is imputed.
17 South America comprises the following countries and territories: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, French Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela.
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tive terms. While in Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s presidency South America 
concentrated 43% of Brazilian visits and 24% of its stations, these figures would 
drop to 35% and 19% in the Dilma Rousseff years. It is clear that, from the Lula 
da Silva presidency onwards, Brazil’s international relations became much more 
globalized. Though this increased activity also generated more frequent visits to 
and more posts in South America, a growing regional detachment and diplomatic 
diversification were also implied.
Figure 2: Turkish presidential diplomacy and diplomatic presence for selected 
regions (2000-2015)18
Source: elaborated by the author.
Figure 2 reveals that Turkey’s diplomatic shifts were much more pronounced in 
the presidential domain. Visits to Western Europe (dashed black line) peaked 
during AKP’s first term, precisely when EU accession talks began, which reflects 
the high degree of personal engagement of the Turkish president and PM on 
the matter. However, right on the following AKP government (2003-2007), 
the MENA region (grey solid line) surpassed Western Europe and became the 
principal destination. This emphasis, however, would be ultimately short-lived. 
As the Arab spring convulsed the MENA and AKP’s third cabinet experienced 
grave backlashes in its regional leadership attempts, the number of visits receded 
promptly. Though this could lead us to believe that Ankara’s Middle-Easterniza-
tion was strong and swift, the data on diplomatic presence nuance this reading, 
as they indicate that Turkey’s consular network in the MENA remained most-
ly stable. Western Europe was the undisputed first place in number of stations 
throughout. Notably, Germany occupied a sui generis position, hosting as much 
18 The MENA comprises the following countries and territories: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, 
Tunisia, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, 
UAE, Yemen, Palestine.
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as 14 stations, while other top-tier counterparts (US, France, Greece), would not 
surpass 5 stations each. This exceedingly dense consular base reflects the strong 
interdependence between Turkey and Germany in terms of trade, investment and 
expatriate community (İçduygu 2012).
By comparing both cases, it is visible that Brazil devoted a higher level of diplo-
matic attention to its immediate region. South America concentrated the largest 
portion of Brasilia’s diplomatic resources, albeit this margin diminished in rela-
tive terms with each passing year. The MENA, by comparison, was vigorously 
prioritized by Turkey for a period, but this emphasis was more pronounced in 
presidential diplomacy and rather brief. Turkish diplomatic presence remained 
strong in Western Europe throughout. 
It is noteworthy that Brazilian regionalism has clearer institutional underpin-
nings, with established regional groupings and accompanying demand for presi-
dential summits and bureaucracy (Medeiros, Lima & Cabral 2016). Though the 
main goal of this article is not to establish causality, it would be possible to argue 
that this institutionalization might explain why Brazil’s diplomatic commitment 
towards South America was more stable, while Turkey’s connection with the 
MENA seemed more mercurial. In addition, it is also visible that both countries 
finished the series with a much more diversified diplomatic portfolio than in the 
beginning.
Beyond the matter of regional centrality, other curious findings are also revealed 
by the data. Both Brazil and Turkey underwent a synchronic expansion in their 
diplomatic presence. They increased rapidly the number of embassies and consul-
ates between 2007 and 2012, in a pace not repeated before or after in the series. 
Nearly all regions received greater consular attention as a result, though the same 
hierarchy tends to be preserved. The main exception for both cases was Sub-
Saharan Africa (solid grey line with circle marker), which moved higher up in 
the ladder.
For Brazil, Sub-Saharan Africa had, in the early 2000s, roughly the same amount 
of diplomatic posts as the MENA, and slightly less than Asia. From 2005 on, 
Sub-Saharan Africa surpassed Asia and it remained the third region with most 
posts until the last recorded year (2015). In the course of those ten years, 18 new 
posts were opened in the continent, more than in any other region, apart from 
the Americas.
This rise is more impressive for Turkey. Sub-Saharan Africa went from merely 7 
posts in the beginning of the series to 36 in the end. In all cases, the new posts 
were the first Turkish embassies opened in those countries. The only exception 
was Somalia, which received an embassy and a consulate general. Hence, though 
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the literature has placed great emphasis on the Middle-Easternization of Turkish 
diplomacy, we can see that the data show concurrently an intriguing Africaniza-
tion. From 64 new posts opened between 2007 and 2015, only 9 were in the 
MENA, while 29 were in Sub-Saharan Africa. While it is true that in other 
metrics, such as presidential diplomacy, the MENA indeed rose to preeminence, 
it was actually the region that grew the least in terms of diplomatic presence.
This focus on Africa reveals an unexpected similarity in the diplomatic agendas 
of the two emerging powers. It is noteworthy that Brazil and Turkey’s diplomatic 
expansions, particularly under Lula and Erdogan, took on the shades of South-
South dialogue, which meant a new and more relevant role for countries outside 
the Western circuit. Brazil’s approximation with the African continent could be 
seen in a number of domains: active presidential diplomacy, a rise in develop-
ment cooperation and other aid gestures – particularly with Lusophone Africa 
– (Mendonça Júnior & Faria 2015; Lima 2017), revival of the Zone of Peace and 
Cooperation in the South Atlantic (ZOPACAS) (Abdenur, Mattheis & Seabra 
2016; Seabra 2017), and discursive attempts to build a symbolic bridge between 
Brazil and Africa as “kin nations”, sharing common history, culture and ethnic 
ties (Mesquita & Medeiros 2016). 
As for Turkey, given that most of the debate on the previous decade was centered 
on its shift towards the MENA, little attention was devoted to its African diplo-
macy, apart from some recent studies on individual countries (Kadayifci-Orellana 
2016). Through the RPDN data, it is possible to visualize how significant this 
African expansion was and to compare it with other foci of diplomatic attention.
Conclusion
With this article, we presented the RPDN dataset, its motivation, features and 
some examples of usage. This contribution is relevant as it fills an important gap 
concerning data availability for emerging countries. We believe RPDN provides 
valuable resources for researchers interested in empirical, longitudinal analysis 
of Brazilian and Turkish foreign policy. As a concluding remark, we would like 
to point out that, through RPDN, we do not seek to advance methodological 
monism or advocate any intrinsic superiority of large N research designs. Our 
chief concern is rather to enable a broadening in the type of research which can 
be conducted on emerging countries – an endeavor for which quantitative data 
is required.
Our brief demonstration indicated how such data can address several research 
problems not yet answered in the literature. By combining measures of presi-
dential diplomacy and diplomatic presence for Brazil and Turkey, we assessed to 
what extent those countries prioritized their immediate regions. It was possible 
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to verify that Brasilia indeed privileged South America in all domains, albeit at 
declining rates, whereas Ankara’s turn towards the MENA was impressive but 
brief and restricted chiefly to presidential diplomacy. The data also revealed how 
Brazil and Turkey displayed a similar interest in strengthening their presences in 
Africa – a finding which warrants further research.
Our example was merely an initial illustration of the usefulness of RPDN and 
how it can be utilized by the research community. Its datasets contain information 
on many other items pertaining to diplomacy, so that we are confident that a wide 
range of other research questions can be addressed through RPDN.
Nonetheless, as discussed throughout the article, the datasets still suffer from lim-
itations. Most notably, not all empirical indicators were available for all countries 
and all years. Likewise, some of the variables were liable to biases and omissions 
due to idiosyncrasies of the information source. Additionally, Brazil and Turkey 
should be regarding as starting points of a greater academic enterprise. Hence, 
there remains significant room for improvement in future versions of RPDN with 
regards to data validity and quality, as well as number of countries included.
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